

MADNESS, METHODS AND MASTERS:
SYSTEMS OF DIRECTION OF SELF
IN WESTERN EUROPEAN LIFE AND THOUGHT

by

Benjamin Nelson

**Reproduced From
Best Available Copy**

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

Prepared for a conference on "Self-Control under Stressful Situations,"
under auspices of the Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc.,
Washington, D. C. on September 9-10, 1962, under Contract AF 49(638)-
992 OSR-USAF.

19990714 133

MADNESS, METHODS AND MASTERS: SYSTEMS OF DIRECTION
OF SELF IN WESTERN EUROPEAN LIFE AND THOUGHT

I.

INTRODUCTORY

In the midst of all their stresses and perplexities, men have everywhere struggled to reduce the burden of their misfortunes and to add to the stock of their joys. Resources without number have been pressed into men's service in the effort to still the agonies of their spirits. Among the most important of these resources have been the symbolic designs through which they express and enact meanings.

Seeking relief from the pangs of indifferent Fortune, they have embraced compelling images of the cosmos and their places therein. Craving ever deeper assurance of justification in their own eyes and in the eyes of their Divine Rulers, they have forged myriad schemas of universal destiny and group and personal identity. Aspiring to triumph over stress, they have devised patterns of spiritual direction more or less suited to the special circumstances in which they are called upon to live their lives.

Although we cannot now--and may, indeed, never be able to--say exactly how well the diverse systems of mental healing fulfilled the hopes and needs of the different peoples they were intended to serve, we may venture a number of preliminary observations:

Each system of mental healing has its own metaphysical commitments; its own way of classifying the various sorts of passions and infirmities which men experience; its own roster of accredited dispensers and techniques of cure. A set of common concerns and procedures, however, is discoverable at the core of all the different systems.

Both nature and nurture equip individuals variously to promote their ends in the worlds they inhabit. If, then, we wish to estimate, perhaps even to predict, their powers to respond to the challenges of their several environments, we must include reference to the many disparate factors likely to be relevant in their varied life situations. The physical coordinates are the easiest to study: How much stress is a subject called upon to bear? At what intervals, over how long a period are the stresses likely to be applied? Soon we discover the need to introduce reference to social, cultural, interpersonal and intrapsyche aspects of the field. How differently we see the problem when we trouble to ask: In whose company, on what occasions, at whose instance is the stress applied? How do individuals estimate the relative shares of stress they are obliged to undergo? How are stresses and responses defined in particular cultures?

We will not go far in discovering how well an individual will probably do, given a battery of stress challenges of different sources--a psychometrician might be disposed to call this his Adjusted Multiple Stress Potential (AMSP) or Quotient (AMSQ)--by cleaving to a purely physicalistic conception of response to stress. All

measurements of human capacity must reflect rather than ignore the distinctively symbolic character of human existence. The so-called behavioral sciences have no way of escaping the cultural dimensions of human behavior.

Rather than attempt to elaborate cross-cultural comparisons at this juncture, I would simply note that the stresses and misfortunes we are called upon to bear seem to us today to derive from different sources. We are prone to distinguish the following sources and kinds of suffering:

1. Those felt to be universal experiences of every biological organism. For example: hunger, pain, sexual desire, illness, onset of death.

2. Those ascribed to the workings of central institutional structures (the economic, social, political, legal organizations). For example: poverty, status inferiority, political insignificances.

3. Those which are felt to be interpersonal in nature and which are generally charged to the malice or ignorance of other persons--injustice, deception, treachery, privation, enforced isolation, enforced contact, loss of trust, punishment, etc.

4. Those generally ascribed to the incursions of the unconscious in the intrapsychic sphere. For example: anxiety, shame, guilt, obsessiveness, loneliness, inability to love, inability to work, feelings of meaninglessness, persecutory fantasies, convictions of omnipotence, homicidal impulses, incestuous desires, etc.

The operations of psychoanalysis may be cited as a preliminary illustration at this point. When compared with the other

familiar systems, it does not in the first instance concentrate on reinforcing abilities to tolerate sufferings located in the first two categories above. There are surely many Yogi exercises which prepare one better for them than does psychoanalysis to tolerate hunger, pain, privation, disease, sexual desire. Psychoanalysis seems to concentrate on developing the power to bear burdens located in the two latter categories (the interpersonal and the intrapsychic spheres). Throughout the entire Freudian schema, emphasis is placed on coping with frustrations and anxieties arising from unconscious repressions of impulses to perform forbidden acts in relation to inappropriate objects, notably the members of one's own family. For Freud, experiences in the earliest years of life in the bosom of one's family are the paradigms of all subsequent development. The interpersonal wounds which children and adults suffer in their primary associations with those who appear nearest and dearest to them are held to leave their mark on all successive extra-familial adult contacts even in the seemingly most rational impersonal environments.

Freud also places great emphasis on the therapeutic importance of a maximum power to know and acknowledge one's own fantasies. Acceptance of one's inner demons is one matter, says Freud; uncontrollable compulsions to act on their every call is another. Here he breaks sharply with previous traditions which declared evil thoughts worse than criminal deeds.

The implications of Freudian psychoanalysis for the distribution of values located in the second category cannot be stated unequivocally. Freud does not summon men to address themselves

directly to the collective remaking of their institutions by planned political action. For this reason, social and political critics often accused Freudians of conservative and even reactionary leanings. Yet a more careful view will directly show that a particular affinity for Freudian views will be found among the mobile metropolitan populations of the advanced industrial societies, which strongly emphasize the consensualistic motifs in their universalistic creeds. It may be noted that official Communist criticisms of Freudian psychoanalysis emphasize its objectionable stresses on individualism, as evidenced in its encouragement of personal pursuit of current gratification in disregard of eventual realization of society's collective goals. Yet the incessant charges that, as opposed to the creative "freedom" ascribed to man in Soviet psychology and philosophy, "bourgeois" psychoanalysis and sociology promote "idealistic fatalism" confirm substantial evidence from other quarters that the Soviet leaders have no desire to spread favorable attitudes to the sorts of analysis, whether psychological or sociological spheres, which are favorably regarded in the so-called "Free World."

These preliminary references to psychoanalysis are not intended to suggest that it is in any sense a superior medicine for every occasion. Every scheme of training has its built-in defects. We never acquire capacities without becoming unfitted for some other task. This holds as true for psychoanalysis as for any other system of self-direction.

Evidence gathered from prisoners of war and concentration camps seems to indicate that three groups fared unusually well in

maintaining their equilibrium in extreme situations: fervent devotees of sectarian movements, such as Jehovah's Witnesses; specialized intellectuals, notably mathematicians, practised in detaching themselves from external circumstances; criminal psychopaths impervious to dominant moral codes. None of these groups characteristically frequent psychoanalysts.

Indeed, we would be remiss if we failed to recognize the extent to which the accredited healers of a given society come to act as a privileged group offering their services on their own terms. The history of conflicts within and among different groups of directors needs to be seen as an illustration of the perennial conflict of mediatorial elites. It is, therefore, not surprising that accredited healers have seemed from time to time to be more concerned to reinforce their status-income-and-power claims than to expand the ability of their charges to direct themselves under stress.

II.

CULTURE AND IDENTITY

Recent discussions by Kluckhohn, Kroeber, Parsons, and others, including some who are among us today, emphasize the need for renewed exploration of the concepts and contents of culture. Luckily, one-sided reductionist accounts of culture as projective responses to the social relations of production or the mothering patterns are passing out of fashion in favor of approaches doing greater justice to the regulative functions of culture. There is a fresh readiness to defer the fixing of causal explanations until due attention has been paid to the horizons opened by other perspectives,

notably the intentionalistic, cognitive, and the configurative approaches.

In some writings of my own, I have investigated four connected ways of approaching the study of culture which appear especially relevant to the present essay: as a Directive System; as Symbolic Form rendering experience as Dramatic Design; as a Defensive System--a protective array of beliefs and attitudes intended to defend us against our anxieties; as the primary resource and net outcome of Symbol Economies, the network of allocative institutions which produce and distribute an inevitable scarce supply of coveted symbols. Reserving this fourth approach for the closing pages, I shall briefly characterize the first three approaches in turn--I make no claim that I escape overlap.

1. Culture may be construed as a repertoire of cues, non-verbal as well as verbal, a "directive system" intended to move individuals and groups to perform in accordance with desired norms. At least five classes of cues may be discriminated. For the sake of economy of diction, I use Latin gerunds to name them.

a) Percipienda cues--this first and most embracing class of cues comprises directives which charge us to perceive any possible object, person, or occasion in a socially required way.

b) Agenda cues--this second set of cues charges us to perform or not to perform one or another act on penalty of sanction or promise of reward.

c) Credenda cues--are those signals or symbols which tells us what or how we ought to believe or not to believe.

d) Miranda cues--are those directives which define what or whom we ought to hold in awe, what or whom we ought to marvel at.

e) Emulanda cues--this fifth set influences us to emulate persons or imitate behaviors of those presented to us as role models, social paradigms, or cynosures.

It hardly needs saying that these five classes of cues are directed at us by agents of induction from the family system, the educational system, the religious system, the political system, etc. I forbear at this time from full elaboration of this particular schema, which was suggested to me by a section in Charles Merriam's neglected book on Political Power.

I would merely observe here that specialists in the systems of spiritual direction are called in when subjects go aground in internalizing these cues and other experiences into workable relation to realities. The possibilities of mishap are countless, varying, from one society to another. The cues within any class or all five classes of cues may be experienced as intolerably stable or unstable, intolerably consistent or inconsistent, intolerably incongruous with the subject's sense of experience. The agents of induction may be felt to be arbitrary in their provision of rewards and sanctions. The task of the spiritual directors is made impossibly difficult when a state of normlessness or crises of identity (anomie) prevails.

2. Culture may also be regarded as symbolic form translating experience as dramatic design. Depending upon one's perspective, mood, or philosophic tradition, the design is either celebrated as the ultimate revelation underlying all appearance or exposed as sheer

convention barely concealing the void of chance. On this view, culture in the sense of form is man's supreme, albeit most ambiguous, discovery. Were it not for the intervention of human concern, the flux of nature and time would be without distinction, direction, or design. Events intrinsically empty of meaning or at best agonizingly equivocal in implication achieve the status of a representative symbol; come, indeed to constitute a higher Truth through the human device of Postulation and the human production of consensus induced by postulation.

To study culture in this spirit is to study the complex processes connected with the invention, attribution, coordination, and action of meaning. In the Beginning was the Word. And by the power of the Word, the chaos of Existence is converted into a cosmos of culture. For ever after, Nature imitates Art and Illusion defines Reality.

This sense of culture as form has been expressed in radically different ways. On the one hand, there have been Plato, Kant, Hegel, Cassirer, Huizinga, Santayana, Whitehead, Suzanne Langer. On the other, there have been the Occamists, the young Hegelians, Kierkegaard and the Existentialists, the Philosophy of "As If," Pirandello, the contemporary leaders of the Theatre of the Absurd.

3. In a related spirit, culture may also be interpreted as a defensive organization of attitudes and practices which are unconsciously elaborated with the view to mitigating the anxieties and fears generated within individuals and by societies. This third way of talking about culture evidently owes its recent accent to

Freud and Malinowski, who tended to emphasize the defensive function of all cultural elements. On this view, we never truly understand what any cultural element comes to mean until we recognize the way in which it serves intrapsychic ends within the specified social framework. Every sphere of culture may be patterned to perform a role in the task of making men more at home in the only world they inhabit. Although I have spoken above of the Freudian tinge of this approach, I ought, in fact, to say that the intimations of this view may be found among the spokesmen of the so-called Existentialist tradition--St. Augustine, the French moralists, Pascal, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Ludwig Binswanger and others.

We return abruptly to our principal theme, the self images and systems of spiritual direction which have evolved in the history of civilization. Throughout we shall be concerned to observe the ways in which these express and shape the ways in which acts and attitudes are defined, meanings ascribed, identities attained, anxieties allayed. The remaining sections of our paper will lightly survey representative aspects of the history of self-concepts and systems of spiritual regulation according to the following plan:

III: Occident and Orient: Some Similarities and Differences.

IV: Socrates, the Stoics, St. Augustine.

V: The Middle Ages: Conscience, Casuistry and Cure of Souls.

VI: The Transmoral Conscience: From Luther to Freud.

VII: Psychoanalysis and 20th Century Culture.

III.

OCCIDENT AND ORIENT

It will not do, as Rudolf Otto has so brilliantly shown in his Mysticism, East and West, to fall into the error of supposing that the images of the soul's illness and recovery vary entirely with changes of time and place. All mysticisms, he observes, have certain elements in common along with their differences. On close textual comparison, Sankara and Meister Eckhart often seem to be speaking the same idiom.

A similar observation applies to the innumerable writings on mental hygiene which succeed one another in the history of mankind. It is surprising to note how many important assumptions they seem to share with respect to:

1. the origin of what we may be allowed to regard as the nuclear traumas of mankind;
2. the characteristics of what are here being called "the madnesses" of men;
3. the methods proposed for the overcoming of these madnesses;
4. the roles accorded to or claimed by spiritual directors of masters.

Yet we would be remiss if, in our concern to establish certain underlying unities of expression and attitude, we failed to observe very notable differences. Thus once again referring to Otto:

By comparison to Sankara, Eckhart is inextricably Western, indeed in Otto's terms, Gothic and Faustian. Otto writes:

His mysticism is quiveringly alive and of powerful vitality, and therefore far removed from "Abstraction." It is therefore also very far from Sankara and Indian mysticism, and the reason for that difference lies in the foundation from which it rises.

In spite of great formal equalities, the inner core of Eckhart is as different from that of Sankara as the soil of Palestine and of Christian Gothic Germany in the thirteenth century is different from that of India.

* * * * *

2. That is indeed numinous rapture. At the same time it is subtly different from that of Sankara. This difference moreover is connected with what we have already described as the Gothic element in Eckhart's conception of God in contrast to Sankara's static Indian conception of Brahman. This distinction between the Gods occurs again in the emotions with which they are sought, striven after, experienced. For Sankara when the soul (ātman) has "come come" to the eternal Being (Ātman) it is there, it has arrived (āpta), it is at rest and fully content (śānta). But Eckhart is, in truth, never "there," never in a final static rest:

Similarly, if one were asked to sum up in a phrase how Eastern and Western schemas of spiritual direction differ, one might venture to say that Oriental methods seem to be directed at the overcoming of the anguish of the individuated ego undergoing pain and privation in a remorseless world incapable of being notably ameliorated, to say nothing of being redeemed. Salvation seems to be achieved by escape from this burden into the primal, undifferentiated ground where all oppositions vanish.

The Western Christian image of man's Fall from Grace begins with the same sequence: the original unity; the nuclear trauma; the loss of paradise; the separation from the source of all goodness, truth and virtue; the haunting sense of alienation and estrangement. As in the East, alienation exhibits itself intermittently as:

1. over-attachment to irrelevant ideas and values which will be of no account in regard to man's eternal life;
2. underattachment to the unfailing source of joy or peace;
3. infestation of one's spirit and the world by alien powers and noxious thoughts.

But here the accent dramatically changes and the difference from the East emerges. In contrast to Oriental schemas and their neo-Gnostic expressions at explosive junctures in Western history, the world is described as good, the creation of a good God. The value of the individual soul receives the strongest confirmation. The method of mitigating estrangements and madnesses are in the first place "a way back" to the primal undifferentiated ground. And then once more the new elements assert themselves strongly. The way back assumes the character of a "way forward," forward to the struggle for mastery of self and the world.

Oriental schemas of self-direction are, in the ultimate sense, quietistic. The immense machinery set into play to liberate us from attachments to the world of passing illusions have as their primary purpose the overcoming of any sense of division from the One, which is all encompassing and unchanging. Western teachings, even

when they sound alike or are influenced by the Oriental works, preserve their peculiar flavor. They are, in the end, activistic. (Professor Otto's translators have written "actualistic," which seems to me not quite what is needed to express the situation.) To be sure, quietism is a recurrent motif in all schemas of self-direction, as it is a phase in every pilgrimage of the spirit, but quietism has never managed to assert itself as a dominant doctrine in the West.

It is instructive, in this connection, to study the details of the controversy over Quietism and Disinterested Love connected with Fénelon and Madame Guyon. Quietism was eventually condemned as a heresy for it appeared to contradict the commandment to love one's neighbor as one loved oneself. Holy egoism, the prescribed sacred love of oneself, was too strong in the Western world to be dislodged by Quietism. Mystical individualism feeds into the instrumental activism of the modern era.

Eastern treatises on the direction of self and others are likely to contain extremely detailed prescriptions and recommendations for the achievement of desired effects. One has only to look into any of the countless Yogi manuals, the Tibetan Book of the Dead, the Zen treatises, and other works of spiritual hygiene. There is very little of this in the West. The methods to be employed range from auto-hypnotic trances to extremely intricate sets of physical exercises intended to demolish what might be called the body armor or the somatic resistance. Western works are markedly free from technical details.

Could one reason for the contrast be the limitations placed on magic and the magical viewpoint in Western thought? Perhaps Western

postclassical, Judaeo-Christian culture is simply more generally philosophical and psychological. In truth, we have no explanation. We simply have a fact. The Western treatises go on the assumption that the "way back," which is also the "way forward," involves the journey into the self, which is always construed as the soul.

Now and then a particular master or theorist will recommend procedures which have the ring of auto-hypnosis. Thus, for example, in the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola, we have an extraordinarily systematic arrangement of meditations which are aimed to lead the believer to arrive at an ultimate and irrevocable decision to be a soldier in the ranks of the good Lord and an enemy to death of the Devil and all his works. The exercises of Loyola involve repeated reflection with the mind's eye on the terrors of hell, on the sufferings of Jesus on the Cross, on the fires of purgatory, on the dread of damnation. All else is to be eliminated from awareness in order that the experience of horror might be complete and the need for redemption might be experienced in the depths. It is no secret that Oriental elements have been detected in the extraordinary emphases of Loyola.

In closing this section, one is again compelled to cite Otto:

If we turn again to Sankara, we can measure in full the distance between the two masters. Sankara knows the ātman in us, but this ātman is not the soul in the Christian and Eckhartian sense: it is not "soul" as identical with "Gemuet," infinitely rich in life and depth, a place of ever fuller experience and possession, an "inward man" with the characteristics of the biblical conception of this word. Least of all is his ātman, "soul" in the sense

of religious conscience, which "hungers and thirsts after righteousness," and for which "to be" is to be righteous with the very righteousness of God. Sankara's mysticism is certainly mysticism of the ātman, but it is not soul-mysticism as Gemuetsmystik. Least of all is it a mystical form of justification and sanctification as Eckhart's is through and through. And Sankara's mysticism is none of these things because it springs not from the soil of Palestine, but from the soil of India.

* * * * *

Eckhart thus becomes necessarily what Sankara could never be: the profound discoverer of the rich indwelling life of the "soul" and a leader and physician of "souls," using that word in a sense which is only possible on a Christian basis. Upon Indian soil there could never have developed this inward unceasing preoccupation with the soul's life as a life of Gemuet and of conscience, and therewith the "cura animarum" in the sense which is characteristic of, and essential to, Christianity from the earliest days. It is upon this calling as a curator animatum (shepherd of souls) that finally everything which Eckhart has said or done as a schoolman or as a preacher, as a simple Christian or as profound Mystic, depends.

And now to Greece and Rome.

IV.

SOCRATES, THE STOICS, ST. AUGUSTINE

Thanks to Professor Hadas and the Conference program chairman, I am relieved of the heavy responsibility of dealing with the intricate developments in the sphere of spiritual direction in classical antiquity. The few remarks I will permit myself in this connection bear upon one issue of particular interest to the argument of this paper, the recurrent rivalries among different sorts of spiritual directors throughout the history of the West.

I have elsewhere sought to show that from the time of Socrates to our own day, philosophy and psychiatry have been in a relation of antagonistic cooperation. Philosophers (for example, Epicurus, Descartes) have been as prone to proliferate psychiatries as mental healers (for example, Jung, Binswanger) have been to proffer philosophies. These crossings of the never well-defined twilight zones inevitably occur in times of troubles when men grope for help from every source. At such times, philosophy accentuates its concern with spiritual direction, the true hygiene of the straying mind. Logic and physics are treated as simply the first steps in the way to therapy. Ethics becomes the quest for consolation.

The different faces of philosophy--science, self, examination, therapeutic conquest of ignorance, consolation--are all mirrored in the life and thought of Socrates. An increasing stress upon the cathartic function of philosophy as a purgative and therapy is apparent in the Hellenistic schools, in the Epicurians, Cyrenaics, Cynics, Skeptics, Stoics.

Through philosophy we win our way to a holy apathy and detachment; a relief from the pains afflicting anyone who sets his heart upon unattainable ends or evanescent pleasures. The task of philosophy is to present an unassailable truth free from illusion or blandishment. The Stoics bid men to live in accordance with nature and to conquer every impulse which divided them from natural law. The Cynics emphasized release from attachment to complex products and mode of satisfaction. Innumerable stories of Diogenes, the Cynic, connect happiness with the abandonment of vain imagining and futile

pretence. The Skeptics also viewed philosophy as the criticism of illusion. Their minute examination of the traps of logic and epistemology were intended to free men from subordination to painful superstition from which they could win no joy. The stress on the therapeutic role of suspension of belief recurs all through the Skeptical tradition and is perhaps seen most clearly in the writings of Sextus Empiricus.

One of the clearest ways of seeing the distinction between classical and patristic Christian approaches to the direction of self and mind is by comparing two sets of meditations--the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius and the Confessions (or Meditations) of St. Augustine. Marcus Aurelius strives to present himself as philosopher King, a perfect Stoic. The net effect he seeks to convey is that he is possessed of an indomitable will to free himself of every infirmity and defect through his own exertions. Everywhere he looks, he sees shortcoming, pettiness and a failure to express the world spirit in action. His meditations are aimed to purge himself of every least unworthiness.

St. Augustine sounds a different note. He talks frankly of his boyish sins and manly passions; he humbly admits his metaphysical bewilderment and his recurring fear of meaninglessness. Feeling himself adrift at sea, he does not fear to avow his need for faith, hope, and love.

The contrast between the Roman Emperor and the Christian Bishop has always seemed to me to have peculiar relevance for the understanding of the fluctuating sensibility of our own time.

V.

THE MIDDLE AGES: CONSCIENCE, CASUISTRY AND CURE OF SOULS

A paradigm familiar to contemporary social scientists may help to express many central convictions of the medieval Christian consciousness. Freely adapting for our purposes a schema originally devised to classify the determinants of culture and personality, we may say that the Church viewed mankind and the world as follows:

Every man was in certain respects

- a) like all other men,
- b) like some other men,
- c) like no other man.

(How odd the forthcoming details will sound to those who recall the original expansions in the essay by Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray!)

A. Every man is like every other man in certain critical respects. All men are assumed to be sons of God. As such they share in the possession of reason and are answerable to God for the right use of reason. Thus all men are obliged to obey the moral law made available to them by the Law of Nature. As spiritual brothers, all men are obligated to the requirements of brotherhood.

B. Every man is like some other men in the sense that they form historically separate communities within the universal brotherhood. Only Christians have received Christ and the New Testament. All Christians--and only they--are bound to preserve the true Faith, to obey the precepts of the Church and The Canon Law (which after 1215 included the annual requirement of confession).

Yet Christians differ among themselves in many ways, most obviously estate and vocations. Warriors, peasants and monks have distinct "callings." Only the monks are called the "religious"; obey the counsels as well as the precepts; observe a rule; live by the triple vow of poverty, chastity, and obedience; may expect to qualify for the status of perfection.

C. In the ultimate sense, no two men are alike. Each is a unique person immediately responsible to God for the welfare of his soul and the well-being of his brother. Who has not heard of the fateful medieval integration of the beliefs and sentiments stated in this paradigm? The extraordinary stress on the responsibility of each individual for the activity of his will and the state of his soul attained its height in the High and Later Middle Ages. Three sets of ideas and institutions--none entirely new in human history--were now fused into a single structure of spiritual direction never before (some will say never since) matched in complexity. I refer to the beliefs and cultural arrangements embracing the determination of the individual conscience; the realization of the dictates of conscience in the perplexing cases or alternatives in the here and now (called casuistry); the management of errant, perplexed, and obsessively scrupulous consciences, the so-called cura animarum (care or cure of souls). All three of these bodies of ideas are found in many parts of the world--surely they were previously known in one or another way to the peoples of the ancient Orient, and, above all, to the Greeks and Romans--but never before the Middle Ages nor after have they been so systematically elaborated in thought or so closely connected in

practice. In the Middle Ages this imposing institution in its more generally known form came to be called the Forum of Conscience and the Tribunal of the Soul. It is this court which was later to become the source of the Jurisdiction of the Chancellor, The Keeper of the King's Conscience, in Equity.

Actually, conscience was the center of two related but separated institutions of spiritual direction to which different sorts of persons repaired for different reasons. Every Christian without exception was answerable to the Forum of Conscience for the sins he had committed and for the state of his soul. In this tribunal the presiding officer performed a complex of functions. He was a confessor, hearing or eliciting admissions; a judge, fitting the penalty to the crime; a physician, providing solace to the sinner without traducing the rights of God; a priest, mediating God's grace in the sacrament.

In addition and beyond this path to perfection was another avenue for the more ardent wayfarers, those who thirsted to experience true illumination and mystical union with God. Only these were expected to engage in the systematic practice of meditation. Under ordinary circumstances, the deliberate quest of illumination was pursued exclusively only by the so-called "religious"--monks and nuns--who strove to attain the status of perfection. The rich tradition of mystical itineraries is chiefly a monastic one until the fourteenth century, when pious men and women sought to achieve the status of perfection without wholly abandoning the world. The significance of this desire of laymen, especially those of the Low

Countries and the Rhineland, to practice innerworldly asceticism, albeit under priestly direction, will not be lost on readers of Weber.

As must be apparent, the ruling perspectives of the two institutions of conscience were quite different. The outlook of the Forum of Conscience was predominantly legal or forensic; the sovereign end of the practice of meditation was the shedding of the old Adam, the total rebirth of the soul. In this endeavor the purgation of conscience was only the first step on the ladder. The consummation devoutly hoped for was the mystical embrace of Christ with the illumined spark of the soul.

Let us now deal with each of these institutions in turn.

Interestingly, it is the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries--the era of the Crusades, of Western recovery of the Mediterranean, of expanded urban liberties and mass social heresies, of vernacular literature and the new Universities--which witnessed the extraordinary advance of the new logic of conscience and the emergence of a new system of administration of the cure of souls. This fact alone should suffice to warn us against the naive assumption that the idea of conscience could not appear until the Reformation because of the oppressions of the Medieval Church. It was Abelard who revolutionized the dialectic of moral agency and decision. The titles of his major works--Sic et Non (Yes and No), Ethica seu Scito te Ipsum (Ethics or Know Thyself)--powerfully dramatize his dual effort: to develop the implications of the new moral sense, to apply reason in harmonizing the ambiguities of tradition. Like Luther after him--the contrast

is as compelling as the comparison--Abelard was strongly attracted to St. Paul. The dictum Quod non ex fide peccatum est suddenly seemed to require a complete reinvigoration of the human will and, therefore, an exhaustive analysis of the shades and grades of evidence, opinion, knowledge, commitment. (Luther, by contrast to Abelard, drew the opposite lesson from the Epistle to the Romans. He became the champion of the "serf will" and the foremost enemy of a casuistry of intention.)

Long before Aquinas, authoritative medieval theologians and jurists were construing conscience as the proximate (not the remote) rule of right reason. Specialized treatises tracing the obligations of conscience in the here and now, spelling out how individuals were obligated to act in every case they encountered in the conduct of their lives, began to appear. In these works, conscience extended into every sphere of action, ranging over the whole moral life of man from the making of contracts to the making of war. After 1215, when annual confession became the obligation of all Christians, these treatises became the guides to Christian souls everywhere. The influence of handbooks on conscience survives wherever Catholic religious life is practiced.

Only one sphere, strictly speaking, was beyond conscience in the Middle Ages--the sphere of Revealed Faith. Two positions, which seem contradictory to the illumined conscience of later days were vigorously affirmed by all the scholastic moralists:

1. everyone was under the strictest obligation to act in accordance with the findings of his convinced conscience;

2. a convinced conscience (conscientia certa) was not necessarily a right conscience (conscientia recta). Not the individual conscience but Eternal Revelation, the natural law, the canon law and other binding rules were the ultimate imperatives of the individual conscience.

The transvaluation of the value of conscience, its detachment from the practical life of man and its expansion into and confinement to the sphere of Faith did not occur until the Reformation. The story of the storms which culminated in this situation will be discussed in our next section on Protestantism. Here we will look more closely at the development of the meditative tradition. It was within this institution that there emerged the notion of an illumined transmoral conscience which was to prove the undoing of the Forum of Conscience and the source of the ideas of Inner Light and of the Enlightenment Concept of Reason.

There is a vast literature reporting early Christian and medieval efforts to experience the vision of God and enjoy Him in mystical union. Thanks to Father Poulain, Evelyn Underwood, Henri Brémond, Bishop Kenneth Kirk, and others, we are now able to trace the development of the philosophies and techniques of meditation in the successive works of such celebrated masters of the contemplative life of the pseudo-Dionysius, the Areopagite, Johannes Climacus, Richard and Hugo of St. Victor, St. Bernard of Clauvaux, St. Bonaventura, Meister Eckhart, Thomas à Kempis, the anonymous author of the Theologia deutsch, which left its mark on Luther.

With endless variation of images, these authors explore the spiritual ills of men, the arduous pilgrimages which need to

be undergone if peace is to be won for the soul, the indispensable role of masters in the achievement of what we would call cures and insight. The psychological and religious dimensions of these works are suggested by their eloquent titles, for example: The Celestial Heirarchy, The Mind's Itinerary into God, The Cloud of Unknowing, The Goad of Love, The Imitation of Christ, The Spiritual Exercises.

Each phase of the spiritual pilgrimage is minutely examined in the light of the individual author's experience and conviction. Thus Johannes Climacus, the Byzantine author of the Ladder of Divine Ascent, is singularly revealing on the subjects of gluttony, shameful fantasies, and the value of subordinating one's will to the master under all circumstances. St. Bernard is supremely eloquent on the mystical love of Christ.

It is St. Bonaventura, the noted 13th century Franciscan thinker, who provides the systematic psychological and theological analysis which helped to codify the distinctive convictions and procedures of the meditative tradition. The titles of three of St. Bonaventura's works express his central perspectives:

The Threefold Way - In this extraordinarily influential work, Bonaventura systematically sets forth the triple way of the contemplative life: the purgative way, the illuminative way, and the perfective or unitive way.

The Mind's Itinerary into God - This work, explains a recent editor,

...is addressed to those who are ready to answer the divine call to live the mystical life and to taste of God's sweetness in ecstatic union.

The Reduction of the Arts to Theology - Here Bonaventura vigorously states the neo-Platonic philosophy of illuminism in the hope of showing that all human understandings and arts are the reflections of God's light made available to men in different ways.

An authoritative analysis of Bonaventura's mystical theology is provided by the late Father Philotheus Boehner. (It should not surprise us that Father Boehner won international acclaim in the scholarly community under another guise, as one of the world's foremost experts on medieval logic and William of Occam. Mystical illuminism and scientific logic and experimental science have been much more closely connected with one another in the history of thoughts than "religiously unmusical" American writers have generally understood.) Father Boehner writes:

The mystical life consists in three ways and in three exercises. The ways are the purgative, the illuminative, and the perfective or unitive; the exercises are meditation, prayer, and contemplation. When emphasizing the activity of the soul on these three ways, the Seraphic Doctor prefers to speak of hierarchical acts, since they cause the soul to conform to the celestial hierarchy. All these ways or hierarchical acts lead to contemplation in the strict sense. Although they have an order, the purgative way being the first and the perfective way the highest, nevertheless, the soul, striving after the highest experience of the religious life here upon earth, always remains on these ways and always has to practice the hierarchical acts. The first leads to peace; the second, to truth; the third, to charity. Correspondingly, the soul makes use of its three powers or aspects, of the stimulus conscientiae (self-examination), the radius intelligentiae (the ray of intelligence), and the igniculus sapientiae (the spark of wisdom).

On the purgative way, the soul is mainly concerned with its own misery and pitiful condition because of original and personal sin.

The purgative act is practiced in meditation, prayer, and contemplation. Purgative meditation has as its main object, self-examination; its main purpose is to bring to bitter consciousness the soul's moral disorder and the grave danger which it entails, thus achieving a complete detachment from all sinful inclination. Purgative prayer transforms meditation into weeping and deploring sin and into asking for mercy; its main affections are pain, shame, and fear. Purgative contemplation, finally, leads the soul from shame to fear, from fear to pain, then to imploring prayer, to rigor and severity, and finally to ardor which culminates in the desire for martyrdom, the ultimate purification of love, and makes the soul rest and fall asleep in mystical peace under the shadow of Christ.

On the illuminative way, the soul is mainly concerned with a penetration into truth. The illuminative act is likewise practiced in meditation, in prayer (which is less clearly expressed by Saint Bonaventura), and in contemplation. Illuminative meditation turns the ray of intelligence to the multitude of sins forgiven by God's mercy, broadens it then to show all the benefits of God, natural and supernatural, and finally turns it back to the Giver of all of them, Who has still greater rewards awaiting the soul in heaven. Illuminative prayer, according to Saint Bonaventura, has, it seems, as its main task to ask for mercy and help in union with the Holy Spirit, groaning in us by an ardent desire, in union with Christ by trusting hope, and in union with the Saints by their intercession. Illuminative contemplation finally leads to the splendor of truth by imitating Christ, or to be more exact, by an impregnation of our mind with the passion of Christ, and that again in seven steps: first there is a humble submission of reason to a God who was crucified, followed by deep compassion, admiration, grateful devotion, the putting on the form of the suffering of Christ, and finally, the ardent embrace of the Cross, in which and through which the splendor of truth will dawn.

On the perfective or unitive way, the soul is mainly concerned with charity. It is the perfective act that is now practiced in meditation, in prayer, and in contemplation. In

meditation the spark of wisdom must be kept aloof from all attachment to creatures, must be enkindled by turning to the love of the Bridegroom, and must be elevated beyond the senses, the imagination, and the understanding into a blaze of desire for the Bridegroom who is absolutely desirable. In perfective prayer the soul is prostrated in adoration and deep reverence, in benevolence and complacence, becoming one with God in the fire of love. Here Saint Bonaventura adds the six degrees of the love of God. In perfective contemplation the soul again reaches the sweetness of love in seven degrees: vigilance for the coming of the Bridegroom is first; then confidence in Him; third, a deep longing for Him; fourth, a rising beyond oneself to the height of the Bridegroom; fifth, complacence that dwells on the comeliness of the Bridegroom; sixth, joy in the abundance of the Bridegroom; seventh, a union of the soul with the Bridegroom in the sweetness of love.

We must not allow Bonaventura's theological language and homoerotic symbolism to drive us into minimizing his psychological insights and philosophical ingenuity. His exhaustive investigating of the "threefold way" can be examined with profit by contemporary psychiatrists. His depiction of the Mind's Itinerary and the relation of the arts to theology are important steps on the way to modern thought. It is in a way accidental that Meister Eckhart rather than the Seraphic Doctor, as Bonaventura was called, had so profound an influence on the backgrounds of the Protestant Reformation. Both men elaborated the image of the soul's rebirth as a result of mystical union with God, which eventually destroyed the medieval institutionalizations of thought and sentiment. Medieval illuminism provided inspiration to Luther, the revolutionary sectarians, the English dissenters, the American Quakers, the myriad Continental

Romantics whose voices sound in the philosophy and literature of the last two centuries.

Again we run ahead of our story. We turn now to Luther and the Reformation.

VI.

THE TRANSMORAL CONSCIENCE: FROM LUTHER TO FREUD

The Protestant Reformation begins a vast new experiment in the culture of the self and the systems of self-direction. The important details of the early history of these developments are not yet even now agreed upon by impartial scholars, and there is the sharpest difference of opinion as to the original associations and contemporary outcomes of the teachings of Luther and Calvin. Our own day has witnessed marked changes in the style of interpreting the meanings of the Reformation. It is no longer possible to say, as used to be claimed, that thanks to Luther's renewal of Christian liberty, the free man possessed of his own free conscience was now released from the fetters of medieval priestcraft and the superstitious doctrine of the efficacy of works. Everyone now knows that Luther was not an enlightener in the manner of Diderot and Voltaire even of Kant. Yet, it does not seem sensible to regard the Reformation as simply a reactionary throwback to the Middle Ages. To call it an "escape from freedom," the seed bed of Nazi totalitarianism, as Erich Fromm did, is to regard the cultural circumstances from a hopelessly alien perspective.

More recent characterizations of the era by David Riesman and Erik Erikson represent an improvement in the social psychological studies of the relevance of Protestantism for the culture of character. Riesman loosely relates the Reformation to the changeover from the traditional to the inner-directed society, touching hardly at all on the unfolding of historical circumstance and teachings. Erikson interprets Luther's triumph over his agonies of conscience as a decisive episode in the forging of a new cultural identity. In truth, we are hardly past the cradle in our understanding of the inner history of conscience, character and culture in the modern world.

The exact influence of Luther on the notions of self and spiritual direction is no easy matter to state. The following must be counted among the decisive facts:

1. In his early years as a reformer, especially in his pre-Reformation treatises of 1520 and his appearance at the Diet of Worms, 1521, Luther assumed the posture, the Liberator of Conscience. His condemnation of the medieval religion of works culminates in the burning of the Corpus of the canon law (Corpus juris canonici) and the so-called angelic Summa on the cases of conscience by Angelo de Clavasio. Luther thus publicly signalized his aversion to the medieval organization of the moral and religious life, above all to the triune integrations of conscience, casuistry and the cure of souls.

2. Once Luther had proclaimed the Gospel meanings of justification "by faith alone" and true--lifelong--repentance, mandatory annual confession, and the fourfold role of the priest in the administration of the sacrament of penance were without foundation.

3. Gone too was the basis of the medieval concept of the moral conscience and the moral effort through casuistry to make conscience operative in the world. Luther's strongly anti-Pelagian theology ruled out the concept of the attainment of Christian perfection through the imitation of Christ, the ultimate paradigm. The Reformation from the time of Luther was set against the medieval system of spiritual direction.

As against these stresses of Luther, we have to recall others which present Luther in a very different guise:

a) Luther recoiled in horror from the conclusions drawn from his teachings on conscience by the left-wing supporters of his movement. In his withdrawal, he relapsed into the medieval truism that conscientia (conscience) was meaningless without scientia (knowledge), Gewissen was folly without Wissen. This endorsement of medieval intellectualism was a blow against the unrestricted emancipation of the conscience from superpersonal norms. It also allowed the continuance of persecutions for conscience, although now under the new charge of blasphemy.

b) Luther's attack on casuistry was coupled with a proclamation of unqualified temporal authority in the political sphere. Conscience was now confined to the religious realm. Inner freedom and outer bondage occupied entirely separate domains in Luther's stark dualism. It was this less familiar side of St. Paul's influence which gave lay rulers a control over men they had not had in medieval civilization.

Again and Again, efforts have been made in the long history of Protestantism to restore analogues of the medieval framework free

of the alleged medieval excesses or corruptions. These results have always been unavailing. Confession, casuistry, moral and religious counsel, organized spiritual direction have lacked for fundamental support within the framework of Protestantism. The individual in Protestant cultures has the choice and the obligation of doing God's will without the aid or regulation of learned casuists, counsellors, and confessors.

According to Weber, Groethuysen, and others, a fundamental reorientation of the social and cultural patterns of the Western world could not occur until the medieval administration of self and spiritual direction fell before the onslaughts of Luther, Calvin and their followers. So long as a distinction was made between the special calling of monks who lived "outside the world," systematically observing a rule in their pursuit of the status of perfection and everyone else in the world, who lived irregularly, without benefit of a rule, in the midst of continued temptation; so long was there a brake on the incentive of ordinary men and women to forge integrated characters with a full sense of responsibility. The Protestant notion of a disciplined character nourished by a resolute conscience replaced the medieval sense of life as a round of sin and penance.

This aspect of the influence of the Reformation has been the subject of continuous debate by sociologists, historians, and culturally inclined psychologists. Recently there has been a shift in the focus of discussion. Interest has lately been centering on the alleged disappearance under our very eyes of the inner-directed

Protestant ethic in favor of a so-called "social ethic" as a result of the spread of the power of the large-scale organization in the institutional structure of the United States. The limitations of this paper do not permit a full-scale review of the evidence in these pages. One observation may be allowed however: current discussions both of the origin and demise of the Protestant Ethic generally neglect to distinguish between the many dimensions of the problem. At no time has Protestantism been lacking for a collective church ethic. The connections between the contemporary organizational ethic and the normative patterns and life style of the Protestant church have been overlooked in the recent characterizations of Riesman, W. H. Whyte, and others.

Many of the most impressive institutional consequences of the Protestant variants of conscience, character, and culture have yet to be appreciated in their full implication. A selected number of episodes will be briefly mentioned in the following paragraphs:

Perhaps the most important development in the Protestant era recalls the struggles and wanderings of the dissenting groups who came from England, Holland and Germany to the United States where the notion of the inner light was to have its foremost influence. The nonconformist illuminist sectarians effected a transvaluation of the value of conscience by subordinating the moral conscience in the medieval sense to the inner light. Neo-Platonic illuminism which had been so significant in the medieval practice of meditation decisively triumphed over medieval rationalism which nourished the medieval administration of the moral self and the form of conscience.

The important links between late medieval mysticism and Protestant illuminism were the concept of the spark or witness of God in the soul (scintilla animae, syneidesis). Modern rationalism of the Enlightenment variety is, strangely, the fruit of Platonic and neo-Platonic mysticism. The shift from the religious to a more secular orientation occurs as early as the seventeenth century. Once the move had been made to the new notion of inner light by the dissenting groups of the seventeenth century, the medieval orchestration of conscience, casuistry and the cure of souls was undone.

Over the centuries, Protestantism has seemed to vacillate between rationalism and fundamentalism. Although these two have been at sword points a thousand times since the onset of the Protestant Reformation, they do not seem entirely dissimilar from the point of view of the medieval concept of conscience. Rationalism is illuminism detached from its mystical source and symbolism. Forgotten is the image of the rebirth of Christ in the soul, leaving the sober afterglow of a reason freed of irrational constraints and declaring the truth by the sole authority of its inner light. Fundamentalism is biblicism, the desperate effort to maintain a fixed point of authority against the threat of the dissolution of landmarks by the work of reason. Both rationalism and biblicism have little need for the learned doctors of theology and canon laws, the learned directors of the soul who crowd the medieval scene.

Romanticism is illuminism in a new guise. It is the deification of the individual ego and the apotheosis of the unconscious forces which have been discovered to be the ego's foundation

and underside. Romanticism joins all other variants of illuminism by rejecting the contextual integration of conscience, and casuistry, and the cure of souls. Romanticism makes the emancipated feelings the sovereign legislator for each man and for all mankind; directly applies these feelings to the complicated circumstances of the daily life resolving the riddles of tangled interest by reference to the command of love and the dictate of will; relieves itself of the need for spiritual counsel by treating explosive impulse as ultimate norm. The most impressive and fashionable expression of contemporary Romanticism is Existentialism. Reducing the matter to a pedantic formula for our present purposes, we may say that Contemporary Existentialism seems to be Romanticism triply armed by three of the most forbidding constructions of modern thought: Husserl's constitutive phenomenology, Heidegger's neo-Gnostic fundamental ontology, and Kierkegaard's neo-orthodox theology of crisis.

The nineteenth century witnessed the near demise of the older arrangements of conscience, casuistry and the cure of souls, and the surge forward of a series of surrogate religions. One of the most powerful among these new religions may be described as the religion of the transcendental self, the transmoral self beyond conscience. Its myriad expressions are elaborated in all the masterpieces of art, literature, philosophy, and even science. Perhaps the most revealing expressions are the intense and stark journeys into the interior which began with Rousseau, Goethe, and Fichte. Every last corner of the phenomenology of existence and spirit is probed in the pages of such philosophers and literary explorers as

Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Conrad, Mann, and Joyce. We are in great need of a thoughtful study of the spiritual itineraries during the last two centuries from the point of view suggested in this paper. Without this, we can hardly hope to understand our own times. If we would appreciate what Freud and psychoanalysis mean in our present era we need to know to what degree Freud is the heir of the religion of the transcendental self, to what degree he is its undertaker. I have elsewhere suggested that the solution to this riddle lies locked in Freud's 'Divine Comedy' which he called by the name, The Interpretation of Dreams. The following lines from a previous essay of mine suggest half of the answer:

[When the Interpretation of Dreams was ended],
there was little life left in the gallery of
guises--Byronism, Promethianism, Parnassianism,
dandyism, diabolism, pietism, scientism,
moralism and so many others--assumed by the
philosophies and substitute religions of the
modern era.

It seems appropriate to close this section of our paper with some reflections on two historical paradoxes marking the relations of Protestantism, the major source of the religion of the self, and psychoanalysis, whose cultural implications are even at this moment being violently disputed.

1. Psychoanalysis did not originate in Protestant settings. It emerges in Catholic Vienna and its pioneer was a Jew.
2. The highest development of psychoanalysis to date has occurred in Protestant America.

So far as the present writer knows, nobody had thought to wonder about the first paradox. I take the liberty of putting my suspicions in the form of questions. Is it possible that the limitations upon the confessional in Protestant lands were too great to admit the growth of organized spiritual direction? Protestant culture tended to produce individuals who understood their responsibility and wills in ways that inhibited recourse to others. Jews and Catholics have never shared the Protestant religion of self-reliance.

How then explain the second paradox? Our most interesting hypothesis on this score has been provided by a French publicist, Raoul de Roussy de Sales. It was precisely, claims this author, because of what we are calling "instrumental activism" in American Puritanism that once it was decided to organize the overcoming of neurosis, no cultural limits were placed upon the achievement of a liberation from sin and guilt in relation to the superego. It was precisely sectarian Protestantism which encouraged the conviction that world and self could be permanently purged of imperfection and confusion. Nowhere else has there been so much conviction in the positive power of unashamed love and self-expression. The social constraints upon the triumph of any such notions on the Continent have always been very notable. America is a country in which, in Max Weber's language, the psyche was to receive its most comprehensive rationalization. If time allowed it would be interesting to trace out the ways in which the social democratic outlooks so clearly noted by de Tocqueville in the 1830's, contributed to the permeation of American culture by psychiatric and psychoanalytic ideas.

If in one critical respect Protestant antipathy to spiritual direction set up barriers to the promotion of psychoanalysis, in another it provided the patterns for the relation of therapist and patient. The weakening of the separate priestly class implied that the relationship of spiritual direction lasted only so long as the client was unable to act on his own with responsibility. This emphasis is a Protestant element within psychoanalysis. From the beginning Freud emphasized that the goal of treatment was the achievement of autonomy on the part of the patient, the ability to regulate his own life by norms of his own devising. Freud was in many ways closer to Kant than to Nietzsche.

It is now time to consider the relations of psychoanalysis to 20th century culture.

VII.

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND 20th CENTURY CULTURE

A new era in the history of spiritual direction begins with Freud. Our knowledge of the formative phases in this development has now been vastly extended thanks to the recovery during the last fifteen years of important documents and unpublished manuscripts. The following sources are especially revealing: Freud's intimate letters to his friend and mentor, Dr. Wilhelm Fliess; the surprising Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895); the candid letter of Breuer on his collaboration with Freud. These new materials carry us far beyond the indications published in Freud's Clark University

Lectures of 1909, History of the Psychoanalytic Movement (1914), An Autobiographical Study and occasional biographical papers.

The turning points in the crystallization of psychoanalytic methods of treatment may be sketched as follows:

1. While still a relatively young man, Freud had the good fortune to be associated with the experienced Viennese internist, Dr. Joseph Breuer, who, as we now know, had a highly developed theory of aetiology and cure of mental disorders. In Breuer's view, hysterical disturbances resulted from undergoing of traumatic experiences which left painful memory traces in a state of hypnoidal suspension. Through the application of hypnotism, the patient achieved the ability to recall the traumatic episodes. The recall was accompanied by the fresh experience and cathartic abreaction of suppressed affects and noxious ideas.

Too many contemporary writers have spoken of the break between the two men purely in terms of their different estimates of the role of sexual factors in the aetiology of neurosis. As Freud tells the story, his first decisive technical departure from Breuer was the abandonment of hypnosis in favor of unrestricted and undirected free association.

2. Another critical moment in Freud's development is associated with his departure from the teachings of Charcot and Janet on the subject of aetiology of hysteria. Whereas the French school spoke in terms of congenital failures in the capacity for psychosynthesis, Freud insisted on stressing the role of unconscious repression of conflicted affect. The implications of this shift for the concepts of therapy can hardly be exaggerated. Freud was thus

launched on the road to construing analysis as a relationship of antagonistic cooperation between therapist and patient. Analysis was, above all, the struggle against the resistances which crystallized in the transference relationship.

(It may be remarked paranthetically here that Freud failed to give due weight in this period of this development to the valuable contribution embodied in the Charcot-Janet position. How are psychosynthesis and executive integration of the ego effected? How, indeed, does the individual under the stress of massive doses of heterogeneous and inconsistent stimuli manage to achieve a stable identity? Fortunately, this way of conceptualizing the problem was not to disappear into the mists. Owing to the influence of Janet and Emile Durkheim on a number of notable writers, notably Elton Mayo, an important social-psychological and psychiatric theory of mal-integration developed in the United States.)

3. Freud reports that the decisive steps in the separation of psychoanalysis from previous therapies occurred as a result of his efforts to understand his own feelings in the course of a) his friendship and correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess, and b) his intensified professional relations with private patients. We are indebted to Kris, Erikson, Jones, John Strachey, and others for important studies of these years.

It will not hurt to repeat here:

It was the need to understand his own feelings, above all, which led Freud to the decisive findings of early psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis in all its senses--an approach to the general theory

of human behavior, a method of clinical research, a technique of treatment--came to fruition in the course of his own self-analysis (1895-99).

Thanks to Strachey's Variorum edition of The Interpretation of Dreams, we can now trace the steps in Freud's momentous journey within. Freud was by no means the first person to undertake this painful pilgrimage. In addition to the philosophers and theologians noted earlier in this paper, one would need to mention such intrepid searchers as Goethe, Kierkegaard, Amiel, Rimbaud, Dostoyevski, Strindberg, Nietzsche. Freud's distinction consists in the fact that he devised a prosaically scientific way of charting the depths he had explored. Neither vilifying nor deifying the inner demons he had uncovered, Freud doggedly sought to map and explain the workings of the unconscious in man's passage through life.

Contented that he had penetrated the riddle of dreams, Freud spent the next six years (1900-05) chiefly in surveying two other domains still shrouded in darkness: the itinerary of the "libido" in the child's psycho-sexual maturation in the setting of the family culture, the action of the unconscious in the psychopathology in everyday life.

The principal cornerstones, as Freud conceived them--The Interpretation of Dreams and his Three Essays on Sexuality--had now been set in the edifice.

4. Freud explains elsewhere that he was spurred on to develop psychoanalysis as a distinctive set of procedures in the hope of improving upon available methods of therapy, notably the

electrotherapy of Erb, the relaxation therapy of Weir Mitchell and the rational therapy of Dubois. His own approach, psychoanalysis, was in use many years before he began to set down his thoughts about therapy. Though the word psychoanalysis was used for the first time in 1896, his first papers on technique were published in 1910, 1912, and 1914. The ensuing discussion of psychoanalytic technique takes its point of departure from these papers.

The exact connections of psychoanalysis with our theme will not be grasped unless we look with a fresh eye at the distinguishing features of the so-called "classical psychoanalytic treatment." This is more easily said than done. Familiar professional manuals rarely explain with sufficient detail and discrimination what implications are to be drawn from the collections of stipulations and procedures presented as "basic psychoanalytic technique." For the present purpose, I shall place the distinguishing features of classical psychoanalytic treatment under two headings, comprising ten articles: Part I, The Analytic Contract, entered into by patient and doctor, comprising five sets of conditions which the patient agrees to observe and two conditions which the doctor accepts; Part II, Analytic Techniques, three articles naming critical aspects of the procedures agreed upon by qualified practitioners. In my view, the seven articles in Part I are not in themselves techniques of treatment, as they are so often said to be, but rather the conditions precedent or the mise-en-scène of treatment. Part II represents minimal agreements as to technique among persons engaged in the practice of psychoanalysis. The least well understood, and, indeed the most controversial article is no. 6, on "interpretation" which is hardly ever defined even in the specialized papers:

Part I contains the following seven articles:

1. The patient agrees to come for treatment at stated times, a fixed number of times per week (six, five, or fewer).
2. The patient agrees to pay a fixed fee in an agreed upon manner at stated times.
3. The patient agrees to adopt a reclining position with the analyst out of sight behind the couch.
4. The patient agrees to desist from "acting out" in extra-analytic encounters.
5. The patient agrees to report his thoughts and feelings without restriction or censorship. This is the so-called "cardinal rule" of psychoanalysis.
6. The analyst agrees to analyze the patient, that is to communicate to the patient "interpretations" by which the patient gains "insight" into his problems.
7. The analyst (implicitly) agrees to terminate the treatment when the patient's condition has been sufficiently improved or been removed.

Part II involves the following three understandings agreed upon by analysts:

8. To the greatest extent possible, in the manner of a surgeon, the analyst is to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality and impenetrability to the patient.
9. Properly speaking, psychoanalysis is analysis of the resistances to cure.

10. In the course of treatment, the resistances concentrate in the transference resistance or neurosis. Therefore, psychoanalysis is the analysis of the transference neurosis.

It is not possible here to deal with more than a few of the issues relevant to the ten articles. I shall especially stress the cultural implications of the cardinal rule on free association (art. 5); the limitations of the analyst's role to "interpretation"; the significance of the emphasis on the analysis of the transference resistance; and the value commitments underlying all ten articles. I shall also ask what important considerations of a cultural nature are "bracketed" (temporarily treated as out of bounds) by classical psychoanalysis. What cultural consequences follow from this methodic suspension?

1. As Freud tells the story, the advantages of "free association" were first brought home to him by a patient who asked him to desist from interfering with her "chimney sweeping." His dislike of hypnotism and his awareness that hypnotherapy had restricted usefulness led him to prefer "free association" as a device for gathering information.

We have only to look closely at the analytic interview against the background of its cultural and social contexts to perceive many functions of free association not emphasized by Freud. The patient encouraged to associate freely is in effect being advised that the analytic session may be regarded as an opportunity to try his wings on the ocean of his unconscious with full assurance that the analyst will buoy him up if he threatens to sink or drift. Since it is uncontrolled fantasy the patient fears, the supervised practice

of free association is a way of developing greater ease in the management of one's own inner demons. In this way, the patient acquires enhanced ability to fight off the frightening feelings and thoughts--the shame, guilt, disbelief, anxiety, panic--occurring in the wake of the stream of associations.

As analysts will know, the ability to be relatively uninhibited in associating increases in the course of the analysis. It is both the effect and the proof of the patient's expanded power to tolerate his wildest fantasies. Supervised association in the analyst's office performs the function of trial exercises of "regression in the service of the ego."

One may observe parenthetically that great creative artists have long understood the necessity of enlarging the horizons of awareness by deliberate regressions. An extraordinary anthology of passages on the avenues to expanded consciousness could be gathered from the writings of such notable figures as Goethe, Byron, Stendhal, Rimbaud, Kierkegaard, Joseph Conrad, Joyce, Nietzsche, Gide, D. H. Lawrence, Mann, Eugene Ionesco and other playwrights currently associated with the so-called Theatre of the Absurd.

An especially memorable passage will be found in an autobiographical statement by Conrad:

Remember that death is not the most pathetic,--the most poignant thing,--and you must treat events only as illustrative of human sensation,--as the outward sign of inward feelings,--of live feelings,--which alone are truly pathetic and interesting....That much is clear to me. Well, that imagination (I wish I had it) should be used to create human souls: to disclose human hearts,--and not to create events that are properly speaking accidents only. To accomplish it

you must cultivate your poetic faculty,--you must give yourself every sensation, every thought, every image,--mercilessly, without reserve and without remorse: you must search the darkest corners of your heart, the most remote recesses of your brain,--you must search them for the image, for the glamour, for the right expression. And you must do it sincerely, at any cost: you must do it so that at the end of your day's work you should feel exhausted, emptied of every sensation and every thought, with a blank mind and an aching heart, with the notion that there is nothing,--nothing left in you. To me it seems that it is the only way to achieve true distinction--even to go some way towards it.

In the consistent opinion of artists and their publics, the greatest figures in the history of literature have been those who have had the courage to plunge into the whirlpools of the unconscious in order to discover truths that have been repressed and denied.

2. The psychoanalytic conception of the relations of master-client is markedly different from the earlier conceptions of this relationship. Innumerable writers before Freud recognized the importance of the emotional connection which he was to call transference. None thought to say that in the treatment proper all other symptoms tended to collapse into the transference neurosis; that as helpful as transference was in promoting therapy the transference was the foremost resistance to cure; that cure was not effected unless the transference, negative as well as positive, was "worked through."

Psychoanalysis is the first schema of direction of souls in the West which conceives transference in this many-sided way. All earlier methods emphasized the religious duty to strive for a

permanently positive transference and allowed no place for the possibility of a negative transference. The new conception of transference implies a new conception of society and self. Freud himself hedged a bit on the matter of the negative transference. His reluctance to become involved in the treatment of the narcissistic neuroses and the psychoses may be explained in part by his unwillingness to become involved in the tempests of the negative transference.

The exaggerated emphasis on the loving relation of therapist and patient in recent days may well be a mark of the discomfort associated with the universalistic consensualism of Freud. Interpersonal psychiatry and existential psychoanalysis and, in this respect, regressions from the Freudian position. This is especially evident in the existentialist's neglect of negative transference. Considerable insight into the importance of provoking the negative transference may be found in several schools of Zen Buddhism.

Universalistic consensualism is the central value on which Freud built his system of psychoanalysis. Anything which restrained the equal freedom of both parties militated against a therapeutic analysis. For this reason he insisted on the equal observance by therapist and patient, alike, of the formal stipulations of the analytic contract. Freud was the first great director of souls who recognized the threats to liberty built into the strongly emotional connections of master and disciple. His exceptional care about the establishment of fees, hours of appointment, etc., subserved this central function.

Easily the best way to discover the strains and gaps which developed in the Freudian system is to study the succession of crises

in the psychoanalytic movement. Ernest Jones and Erich Fromm notwithstanding, all error was not on one side, nor all truth on the other. Nor is it sensible to argue that every act of dissent was a blow for liberty and every defense of the Establishment a justification of intellectual obscurantism. In fact, there is much to be learned about all the principles and doctrinal questions concerned by viewing the history from the perspective of the changing polemical contexts.

Each decade since the origin of psychoanalysis produced its own crises. We may confine ourselves here to referring to the central points at issue in the differences with Adler, Jung, Ferenczi, and Rank in the second and third decades of the present century. To speak of this in turn:

Underlying the separation from Adler was the fact that Freud had allowed his distinctive stress on the dominion of the unconscious to becloud the role of the ego. Adler pressed so hard on this front that he soon found himself in a camp of his own. For the abandoned unconscious, Adler eventually substituted the notion of conscious identification with the "social interest" (Gemeinschaftsgefuehl). Adler's emphasis on the ego was not without influence on Freud's later restoration of an ego psychology within psychoanalysis.

Jung pointed to a more serious gap in the Freudian schema. He was the first psychiatrist to recognize the magnitude of the spiritual crisis which marked the dissolution of traditional religion in the 19th and 20th centuries. His insistence on the symbolic archetypes in the collective unconscious grew out of a desire to provide

guidance to lost spirits who were unable to find meaning in existence without the aid of a metaphysical involvement. The wild exaggerations which came to characterize Jung's work do not vitiate his frequently profound insights. Freud's theories of man and culture did require enrichment.

The psychoanalytic crises of the '20's are not so well remembered today as are the crises of 1912-13. In many ways, however, the crisis of the '20's left a deeper mark on the subsequent development of psychoanalysis as a therapeutic system than did the more widely publicized deviations of Adler and Jung. Here the issues developed out of a dissatisfaction with the inhibiting biases of Freudian theories of aetiology, dynamics, and technique. Ferenczi and Rank both sought to move psychoanalysis toward a greater emphasis on the pre-Oedipal sources of neurosis. Both were deeply stirred by the influence of object-relations in mental development. Each in his own way was convinced that Freud's approved techniques of treatment were unsuitable for the sorts of cases--so-called "borderlines"--increasingly coming into treatment in their day.

Regrettably, Freud's polemics against Rank and Ferenczi drove object-relations theory and treatment technique into a corner from which, surely in orthodox circles, they do not truly dare to emerge even today.

Robert Waelder's recent codification of what he calls basic psychoanalytic theory provides an especially revealing illustration of the severity of the orthodox reaction against the alleged insurgence of a new therapeutic irrationalism. He refused to mention any

deviations from the so-called model technique which have developed in the last three decades on the grounds that all of them are merely restatements of the excesses of Rank and Ferenczi. Instead he calls upon his colleagues to pursue the study of psychoanalysis as a basic science. Only by such efforts can psychoanalysis hope to discover a way of ending emotional and mental disorder. In the name of the pure science of psychoanalysis and, presumably, the ultimate drug, Waelder accepts therapeutic nihilism.

The situation at present may be described as follows:

1. Freudian psychoanalysis has made great inroads into clinical psychiatry at the medical schools and at many important major psychiatric faculties and mental hospitals.

2. To the informed, these external successes do not obscure the fact that orthodox analysis has been undergoing a loss of coherence and vitality at its own core. The efforts of Hartmann and others to build a bridge between psychoanalysis and general psychology by developing a general theory of ego development and function have resulted in notable shifts in Freud's fundamental orientation. The loss of vitality is particularly evident in the inability of classical theory to keep pace with progress in the sphere of technique. Eissler has sought to make room for deviant procedures by permitting what he calls "parameters of deviation from the model technique" on the understanding that these deviations will be liquidated at the earliest possible opportunity in favor of the pure psychoanalysis. The effects of this scholastic compromise have been to inhibit free development and discussion of technique.

Experimental psychiatry has been making new headway in the development of chemotherapy. As usual, utopian claims are made by sanguine publicists.

Among the most perceptive practitioners there is increasing sensitivity to the new challenges presented to the therapist by the deepening crisis in our cultural situation. Psychoanalysis has yet to adjust to the fact that great numbers of men and women are unable to discover meaning in their lives and times.

The slowness of orthodox analysis to relate to the deepened crisis has provided an opportunity for dubious faiths newly borrowed from the Continent. The various forms of existential analysis (Daseinanalyse, American existential analysis) are not really new systems of curing individual souls so much as surrogate religious decked out as clinical psychiatries and philosophical anthropologies. The readiness of the leaders of these movements to preserve orthodox Freudian techniques of treatment is a mark of the insignificance of the role of psychotherapy in existential analysis.

EPILOGUE

Every social system necessarily engages in the production and distribution of coveted symbols. Available resources are allocated to competing uses with a view to maximizing desired value outcomes, which, inevitably, remain in scarce supply relative to effective demand. Within this framework, systems of spiritual direction emerge, which acquire great influence in determining the abilities of people to bear the passions and infirmities societies

and systems define as stressful. The capacity of an individual to perform constructively in the midst of stress is a function of the society's success in maintaining a favorable balance of the supply of symbolic (and other) resources at its disposal.

Mental healers perform critically important functions in the symbol economies of societies. They invent, distribute, and consume significant symbols. Along with other cadres engaged in whatever measure in spiritual direction, they play strategically ambivalent roles in framing definitions of the social, cultural, and personal states of affairs. At different times, as I have elsewhere sought to show, mental healers have acted, in the language of Robertson Smith, as prophets and priests; in the language of Arthur Koestler, as yogis and commissars. We are, in truth, in dire need of fresh research and insight on these fateful matters.

The future of self is extremely obscure in the present historical interim. Depending on their political and philosophical commitments, groups and individuals are describing the self as culture's foremost achievement, mind's vilest metaphysical illusion or society's most noxious disease.

It is still too early to tell how well the Western sense of self will fare in the galactic era ahead. There are powerful forces working at cross purposes in this regard. Whatever the outcome, spiritual directors and systems of direction will continue to play strategic roles in defining stressful situations and aiding men to cope with them. Original nature is too fitful in expression and incoherent in aim to serve Everyman as a trusty guide. So long as

each of us requires us to be symbolically endorsed by others; so long as all aspire to tasting vindication in however vague a sense, we search for our meaning in a design not of our own devising.

The emotional illnesses of men will change their shapes; the techniques of psychological cure will adopt new strategies; mental healers and spiritual directors will claim and be accorded new roles. Selves may light up the skies or they may disappear behind the clouds. But of one thing we may be sure:

Masters, Methods, and Madnesses will be with us to the end.